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The historic visit of U.S. President Richard Milhous Nixon to the People’s Republic 
of China in 1972 solidified a growing diplomatic position in the context of a possible Sino-
Soviet split. This visit was a monumental accomplishment in terms of establishing American 
diplomatic relations with mainland China. At the end of the visit the two governments issued 
a unique foreign policy document named the Shanghai Communiqué. Within the document 
the two governments discussed various topics, most importantly the Taiwan Question. 
Within the Shanghai Communiqué both governments acknowledged and reviewed 
their “long-standing and serious disputes” (US-PRC, 1972). The Taiwan Question was 
outlined as the most “crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations” between the 
two countries” (US-PRC, 1972). The policy decisions outlined within the Shanghai 
Communiqué are laid out in Table 1. 
Since this declaration, China has longed for a concise and resolute conclusion to the 
Taiwan Question. The American government has stated in numerous publications that a 
resolution to the Question is necessary but must be conducted peacefully. While in pursuit of 
a peaceful answer to the Taiwan Question, the United States has shown that it will stand by 
its Taiwanese ally and act in its defense. The Chinese government views America’s support 
of Taiwan as an infringement on its sovereignty due to the territorial claims placed on 
Taiwan and has over time vehemently protested continued American support. 
The American-Chinese relationship has been one of careful, strategic, exasperating 
maneuvers. These two governments’ foreign policy efforts and the resulting relationship are 
similar to a playground. Both governments act like school children teasing each other with 
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pokes and prods for the whole school (international community) to see. But within this 
“game” of reciprocal poking there are nearly 2 billion people, countless nuclear weapons, 
and vast armies. The best description of the US-Chinese relationship in regards to the Taiwan 
























The U.S.-Taiwan-China trilateral relationship initially formed during the 1950s. In 
1954-1955 the American government and the Taiwanese government (the Republic of China 
(ROC)), solidified their relationship with the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 
following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. This treaty was developed with a Cold War mindset 
and called for collective defense in East Asia to preserve the peace against “communist 
subversive activities” (Taiwan and America, 1954). This treaty stood unchanged until 1978, 
when the US activated Article 10 of the treaty. 
Article 10 stipulated the treaty could be terminated with a one-year notice from either 
party. In 1979, the United States withdrew from the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 
and moved its formal relations more in line with the international community. On January 1, 
1979, the United States joined the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the publication 
known as the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. This 
communiqué effectively transferred diplomatic relations between the American and Chinese 
people from Taipei, Taiwan (ROC) to Beijing, China (PRC). 
 Following the 1979 Joint Communiqué and the official declaration of formalized 
relations, there were two major unresolved issues that hampered efforts to build a 
relationship between the two countries. The first sticking point between the American 
government and the PRC was the American policy of arming the Taiwanese government. 
Throughout the process of establishing formalized relations, the issue of arms sales to 
Taiwan had not been resolved (US-China, 1982). Additionally, by April of 1979, the US 
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Congress sought the preservation of the American government’s relationship with Taiwan 
(ROC). 
To preserve the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the United States Congress passed the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Its intended purpose was to preserve a strong relationship with 
a vital Asian ally. The TRA reiterated the American policy regarding the defense of Taiwan 
as stipulated within the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Taiwan Relations Act also recognized 
the formalized relationship between the U.S. and China (PRC) following the Joint 
Communiqué. However, the Act established “informal” relations with Taiwan via the Taiwan 
Institute. The Taiwan Institute was intended to provide (as it still does) the Taiwanese 
government with de facto diplomatic relations with the United States. This American action 
seemingly acted strongly against the Diplomatic Relations Communiqué produced four 
months earlier. 
Three years elapsed, and the Chinese and American governments followed their 
predecessors’ footsteps and met to develop a third joint communiqué. The August 17 
Communiqué of 1982 is the modern capstone for the U.S.-Taiwan-Chinese relationship 
regarding arms sales to Taiwan. As is common for diplomatic messages, both governments 
provide grandiose proclamations supporting previous joint diplomatic actions. Within this 
particular Communiqué, however, the U.S. government stated four important issues: it had 
no long-term intentions of selling arms to Taiwan, the arms sold would not exceed previous 
levels of arms sales in “either qualitative or in quantitative terms,” the U.S. government 
would not increase the amount of arms sold to Taiwan, and the U.S. sought a peaceful 
resolution to the reunification process (U.S.-China, 1982). China provided one important 
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phrase: during the possible reunification process between mainland China and Taiwan, the 
PRC would “strive” for a peaceful solution but would not guarantee it (U.S.-China, 1982). 
The August 17 Communiqué was celebrated by China and the United States, but it 
was extremely ambiguous. Both sides believed they came away from the conference with a 
victory. The Chinese government walked away feeling they had achieved a firm agreement in 
regards to state sovereignty and on a One-China policy (Kan, 2011). The United States 
government believed the agreed-upon terms were only applicable if the Chinese accepted a 
peaceful reunification policy (Kan, 2011). 
Tit-For-Tat Overview 
Tit-for-tat, or reciprocal actions, have been studied within many contexts, including 
business and international relations. The U.S.-China tit-for-tat relationship has played out for 
a substantial amount of time. A tit-for-tat relationship is one of actions taken and 
proportional retaliations to said behavior (Ward, 1990). Stated by another, “Any stimulus by 
one actor may be expected to bring about a proportionate response in kind from the other” 
(Richardson, 1981). Here, the definition I utilize is the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
definition of reciprocal; “expressing mutual action” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012). 
Reciprocal responses by nations are not always sector-determined. That is to say, a 
military stimulus can be met with economic or verbal retaliation (Pruitt, 1969). Reciprocal 
responses may not be achieved for a substantial set of time. To summarize Ward’s research, 
“The literature does not clearly distringuish between short and long term conceptions of 
reciprocity” (Ward, 1990). Ward also concluded that reciprocity appears on an “expanded 





The term “international pariah state” has been successfully congealed with the idea of 
a rogue state. The definitions of both are abstruse and defined differently depending on place, 
time, and author. Within this context an international pariah state is labeled the same as a 
rogue state and thus interchangeable. The definition of a pariah state can be defined as a 
“hostile or seemingly hostile Third World state with large military forces and nascent WMD 
capabilities” (Klare, 1995). Here, a rogue state acts outside of American interests and values 
within their specific region as well as the international system. The definition of “pariah 
states” essentially depends on the eye of the beholder, but includes human rights violations, 
lack of democratically-elected governments and democratic institutions, sponsoring 
terrorism, pursuing nuclear weapons, and being so isolated internationally that 
communication is done by multilateral talks.
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The reasoning behind selecting pariah states to investigate and not “adversaries” is 
due to the level of difficulty in accurately measuring the term “adversary.” The term 
“adversary” has a duelist definition: either friendly rival or hated enemy. For example, during 
the U.S.-French dispute over NATO dominance in the late 1950s the French could be 
characterized as an adversary of the United States; when in reality they were allies engaged 
in a heated foreign policy dispute. The United States viewed the French as a friendly rival. 
During the same time period, the USSR was becoming an ever-increasing enemy. Both were 
adversaries but neither were pariahs. Defining the adversary concept would be a formidable 
obstacle and is beyond the scope of this essay. 
                                                 
1 For more information on multilateral talks reference 6-Party talks with North Korea, 




I feel that the tit-for-tat game can be traced all the way back to President Harry 
Truman’s commitment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits in June of 1950. The 1955 
Formosa Resolution allowed President Truman to, “employ the Armed Forces of the United 
States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That 
Area” (US Congress, 1955). The congressional actions allowed the President to defend the 
island of Taiwan and “neutralize” the area (Tatum, 2002). At the time there was a great 
frenzy and fear of another Chinese civil war (Tatum, 2002). Beyond supporting the 
Taiwanese, this action of direct and overt intervention may have started this tit-for-tat 
relationship. 
Jumping ahead 50 years, the game is still being played. This is expected because, 
“superpower interactions are comprised of many, many repeated plays of the same or similar 
games (Ward, 1990).” The Chinese government does not hesitate to act against American 
stimuli in multiple policy domains. A recent military response by the Chinese can be found in 
their decision to stalk an American battle group (Peck, 2006). A Chinese submarine stalked 
the USS Kitty Hawk and its battle group and surfaced within firing distance before being 
detected. The battle group at the time was in Southeast Asia along the coast of Okinawa, 
Japan. 
The Chinese government also trumpets their stance against US-Taiwan arms sales by: 
publishing White Papers, allowing government officials to cause a publicized racket, and 
having government officials threaten sanctions against U.S. corporations that manufacture 
the weapons. A 2000 White Paper proclaims U.S.-Taiwan arms deals are: an infringement on 
their sovereignty, a threat to their national security, an imperilment of the possibility of 
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unification, as well as an endangerment of regional security (People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), 2000). 
Sovereignty Threat 
 Chinese claims of infringement of state sovereignty by the United States due to its 
support of Taiwan fall within internationally recognized norms of a state system that were 
accepted during the Treaty of Westphalia. The PRC claims the island of Taiwan as a 
province of the mainland according to its One China Policy. China feels strongly that U.S. 
intervention and the sale of arms to Taiwan are actions to support a secessionist movement. 
This overt action violates their state right to territorial integrity. The action also is a violation 
of the hallowed belief that a state’s border shall not be altered by interventionist means. If 
Taiwan successfully secedes from the mainland due to American support, China’s border 
will be drastically altered. 
 American policy makers have felt a One China Policy is acceptable only if conducted 
in a peaceful manner. The American policy stance relates to China’s hesitance to accept 
peaceful measures to accomplish their reunification efforts. The U.S. decision to protect 
Taiwan during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, subsequent interventions, and arms sales could 
be described in terms of violating state sovereignty. 
Regional Flash Points 
This issue of arms sales in the Asia-Pacific region is of great importance because of 
the growing focus of the American government on the Asia-Pacific region. “The future of 
politics will be decided in Asia” (Clinton, 2011). The Pacific and Asia currently hold U.S. 
interests economically, militarily, and socially. The U.S. is interested economically due to the 





 Additionally, America will continue to be drawn to the region because of our long-
standing and prosperous relationships and alliances. 
These long-standing relationships have caused the vision of the United States foreign 
policy establishment to be fixed on the Asia/Pacific region since the Korean War. Today, the 
South China Sea is a hot-button issue within the realm of foreign policy decision-making. 
Nearly all of the nations in the region have extensive land disputes. The Southeast Asia 
neighborhood consists of China, Cambodia, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. All these countries, besides Cambodia and 
Indonesia, stake a claim to the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, or both.
3
 The Paracel 
Islands dispute rests with only China and Vietnam (Pham, 2010).
 4
 The Spratly Islands are 
disputed multilaterally by Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
(Pham, 2010). 
The issue regarding these territorial disputes is founded in what is known as the 
“hydrocarbon factor” (Schofield, 2012). The South China Sea has been tagged as the next 
Saudi Arabia (Mogato, 2012). These disputes are exacerbated by the current occupation 
policies by most of these countries. The occupation of these islands has caused tense 
relations in the region for decades. Tensions have escalated in recent years following the 
discovery of untapped petroleum resources. 
 Currently, the Paracel Islands are occupied by China and the Spratly Islands are 
occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia (Pham, 2010; USA 
                                                 
2 Security risks include countries with unstable governments or pesky terrorist 
insurgencies: Philippines, North Korea, Myanmar, etc. 
3 The CIA Factbook does not acknowledge Indonesian or Cambodian claims to either of 
these island chains. 
4 The CIA Factbook states Taiwan also stakes claim to the Paracel Islands. 
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Central Intellignce Agency, 2012). Recently, Vietnam’s Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, 
stated the occupation of the Paracel islands was done by military force during the end of the 
Vietnam War, which caused the Vietnamese on the island to flee Chinese repression (The 
Philippine Star, 2011). Each country’s claims and disputes are based on historical arguments, 
international definitions, and a whole host of other issues. 
 Each country is trying to expand its boundaries as far into the South China Sea as 
possible. These claims are at times even beyond UNCLOS standards in hopes of establishing 
Exclusive Economic Zones (Beckman, 2010). The South China Sea has become a 
competitive marketplace for natural gas and petroleum. The countries located within the 
South China Sea neighborhood are labeled as emerging economies and are attempting to 
establish a sense of energy security to feed those economic demands (Schofield, 2012).
5
 
According to the 2010 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the South China Sea has the 
potential for 1400 Mb to 5000 Mb of petroleum to be extracted (USGS, 2010). 
The occupational policies and the related tit-for-tat policies implemented by these 
countries are additional examples of potential flash points in the region.
6
 Due to this 
increasingly unstable environment so close to Taiwan, there is American concern about 
events in the region. Additionally, any series of actions or stimuli could cause the U.S.-
China-Taiwan reciprocal actions to spiral out of control into uncivil territory (Pearson, 1999). 
The threat of instability is compounded due to the increased military expenditures of 
those in the region. Between 1979 and 1989, the combined Gross National Product (GNP) of 
                                                 
5 It should be mentioned that the available data for total reserves within the South 
China Sea are chaotic at best. 
6 In recent years there have been a series of ship seizures in the South China Sea due to 
territorial infringement claims. 
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China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and others in the region increased by 
166 percent (Klare, 1993). The funds necessary for dramatic increases in military 
expenditures can be linked to the South China Sea’s economic growth (Klare, 1993). During 
the same time period the military expenditures for those listed above increased by $20 billion 
(U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991). Additionally, the North Koreans and 
South Koreans have recently engaged in tit-for-tat exchanges that compound the potential for 
regional flashpoints. 
Foreign Policy 
Why does China continue to pursue this tit-for-tat policy in regards to the United 
States? The answer lies in the domestic policy rhetoric of both countries. According to David 
Shambaugh, China has an international identity crisis. Those in a position to affect the 
government’s policy directions and decisions do not have a shared identity but belong to 
different schools, or “tendencies” (Shambaugh, 2011). Shambaugh outlines seven schools of 
thought that are active in policy discussions within China: Nativist, Realist, Major Powers, 
Asia First, Global South, Selective Multilateralism, and Globalism. He indicates the Realist 
school is the most dominant and centerpiece for policy decisions, but a large, growing, and 
vocal population of Nativists must be catered to as well. 
Chinese Nativists are nationalistic voices that cater to the growing xenophobic 
sentiments within the country. This school’s philosophical cornerstones are distrust, 
sovereignty, and isolation. Nativists also hold strong ties to Marxism and feel the recent 
“open door policy” in regards to China has eroded traditional teachings. They also hold a 
strong proclivity toward anti-Americanism and distrust of the international system. 
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Within the essay, Shambaugh distinguishes between the offensive and defensive sects 
of Chinese realism. Chinese Realists generally “take the nation-state as their core unite of 
analysis, uphold the principle of state sovereignty above all else, and reject arguments that 
transnational issues penetrate across borders” (Shambaugh, 2011). Offensive Realists within 
China follow the landscape drawn out by Mearsheimer’s 2001 account, wherein the 
international system is chaotic, and consequently states act in a primal nature to ensure their 
survival, should possess military capabilities, and should use said capabilities to pursue 
security. Chinese Defensive Realists want a strong military but feel it should be used as a 
deterrent (Shambaugh, 2011). This policy adherence does fall in line with the universal 
umbrella theory of defensive realism outlined by Jervis (1978). 
American realists generally hold the same if not extremely similar views on the 
international system. U.S. policymakers similarly feel public pressure to answer calls for 
action. Recently, policymakers have called for action due to alleged unfair trade practices by 
China within the solar energy sector (Hoffman, 2012). Shambaugh issues a warning to those 
American policymakers who want to fight China fire with U.S. fire: “A realist U.S. response 
will only contribute to an inexorable action-reaction cycle” (Shambaugh, 2011). 
China’s dominant policy analysts, the Nativists and Realist schools, are obsessed with 
power and security concerns. American analysts are equally concerned with similar issues. 
Since both countries are ratcheting up their focus on security concerns there may be an 
increase in strategic competitiveness that hovers around the numerous flashpoints discussed 
earlier. “Escalating strategic competition could emerge quite unpredictably” and is thus 
extremely dangerous (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). Due to this unpredictability, 
“uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that 
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other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities” 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). 
This uncertainty can cause a security dilemma between two states. A security 
dilemma occurs when two or more states are in conflict with each other and are 
simultaneously attempting to increase their own security. While one state increases its 
security the other(s) will feel as though the action is threatening, thus leading the threatened 
state(s) to engage activities leading to perceived security increases. This can develop into an 




















The Chinese government could respond in any number of ways to U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, including economic, military, or social actions. China potentially could: 
 Pressure North Korea into action against South Korea 
 Pressure North Korea into actively violating sanctions 
 Increase the price of the precious metal tungsten 
 Narrowly focus on military actions 
 Violently crack down on democratic or Tibetan dissidents 
 Sell arms to pariah states 
The following is a discussion of these policy options. 
In response to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales China could pressure North Korea into some 
level of action against South Korea such as shelling islands, sinking navy vessels, testing 
nuclear weapons, or launching test missiles.
7
 Pressuring North Korea to poke and prod at the 
South would move American attention away from Taiwan but could cause an international 
incident into which China could be drawn. 
China has been North Korea’s greatest supporter in terms of food and fuel since the 
Korean War. China is interested in stability and border security, and pressuring North Korea 
to provoke South Korean could cause the outbreak of war. A South Korean response to a 
Northern provocation may be opportune because the North is in the beginning stages of a 
                                                 
7 Recently, the North has been accused of sinking a South Korean Navy ship as well as 
launching an artillery barrage on a South Korean controlled island. They have also 
tested a string of ballistic missiles. 
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power transition following Kim Jung-Il’s death. If the South reacted militarily, China could 
be dealing with a refugee problem in Manchuria as well as a collapsed government as its 
neighbor. The international community as well as America will look harshly on China for 
either causing or failing to prevent war.  
The North Korean regime has been subject to sanctions by the international 
community regarding numerous issues including nuclear testing, arms sales, etc. The North is 
also sanctioned unilaterally by the United States and others.
8
 China could pressure the North 
in an attempt to violate international and unilateral sanctions as a response. If China 
successfully pressured the North without the U.S. or the international community’s 
knowledge, China would be called upon to assist the international community wrangle the 
North Koreans through conferences such as the 6-party talks.  
If the North begins to stockpile nuclear weapons China would lose its position as the 
only nuclear power in the region. China’s government definitely does not want a strong 
nuclear presence in the North because they would have to make room at the head of the table 
for North Korea for regional decision-making. China’s policy of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of another country could be threatened if they are seen meddling with a 
sovereign country (Lewis, 2010). This would draw even more attention toward China 
because of their long and harsh opposition to such actions and would raise questions about 
their stance on Taiwan. 
China’s resource base is massive and has allowed the country to be relatively self-
sufficient in terms of raw materials. China has access to the world largest minable reserves of 
                                                 
8 For a complete list of unilateral sanctions regarding North Korea on the part of the 
United States, the U.S. Department of the Treasury compiles and updates a list. The lists 
can be found on this website: http://www.state.gov 
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the valuable metal tungsten. Currently, China produces about 85% of the world’s tungsten 
materials (Saefong, 2006). This material is a strategic necessity for two reasons: 
 Usage within the economy 
 Usage in the military 
Tungsten is used by every industrialized economy in nearly ever sector for hard-metal 
applications, light bulbs, tools, dies, armor-piercing bullets, etc. If the U.S. were cut off from, 
or experienced drastic increases to the price of, tungsten, there would be drastic ramifications 
(Lifton, 2006). 
China would be hard-pressed to increase the price of tungsten so greatly that it could 
be used as a tactic against Taiwan arms sales. Commodities in the past have been used as 
diplomatic leverage, such as the Oil Embargo of 1973. Tungsten, however, is utilized by so 
many industrialized countries that this policy would not only threaten America but also 
would provide a challenge to China’s relationships with other world economic powers. China 
lacks petroleum and uranium resources, and increasing the price of tungsten could cause a 
ripple effect that could haunt them. 
As a response to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales, China may chose to focus narrowly on 
military actions. China’s military is the world’s largest, with 2.8 million in uniform (CNN 
World News, 1999). In recent decades the PRC has allocated resources to modernize the 
military with retrofitted aircraft carriers and newly-developed stealth technology. To 
continue to overhaul the military the PRC must increase its expenditures. According to a new 
report, the Chinese military will spend over $100 billion for the first time in 2012 (Richburg, 
2012). However, China’s military is still largely old and outdated. 
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In 2006, China almost caused an international incident when a PRC submarine 
stalked the USS Kitty Hawk and its battle group. The United States’ military size is far from 
the 2.8 million-strong Chinese military, but what it lacks in size it makes up for in technology 
and operational capacity. The likelihood of a military engagement will increase exponentially 
each time the two militaries cross paths. 
China also could elect to crack down violently on domestic dissidents similar to 
recent actions taken on human rights lawyers, Tibetans, and other anti-government protesters. 
The crackdown would be a show of strength and government control against alleged 
subversive activities, but this decision would demonstrate continued violent tendencies by the 
central government. These crackdowns could be counterproductive and reinforce the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship because of American policy favoring peaceful resolutions to conflict. 
I feel China responds to American arms sales to Taiwan with in-kind arms sales to 
pariah states for a number of reasons: 
 Solidify their stance as a dominant world power 
 Build international relationships 
 Counter America’s global influence 
 Stimulate its domestic arms industry 
The world’s greatest international players are also some of the world’s largest 
exporters of military hardware. The top twenty weapons manufacturers by country are 
outlined in Table 2 (SIPRI, 2012). For a country like China not to host a perennial arms 
manufacturer illustrates the need to increase sales to join this world powers club. 
 China, like other nations, uses arms sales to establish and/or maintain relationships 
with recipient governments. Creating and maintaining a healthy relationship with people 
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relies on accommodations, needs, and desires. The same characteristics are looked upon for 
building relations between countries and governmental leadership. One of the services China 
offers to build relationships with resource-abundant nations is to provide them with 
opportunities to purchase arms. This is advantageous for the People’s Republic of China to 
open its doors to nations looking for arms. 
 America’s global influence has been dominant for decades. Militarily the United 
States has the largest defense budget of any country in the world and has been referred to as 
simply “impressive” (Nye, 2011). For decades the U.S. has spent between $500 billion and 
$700 billion on defense budgets alone (The Economist, 2011; Cloud, 2012). The U.S. also 
spends between $21 and $28 billion on foreign aid assistance per year (Wroughton, 2010). 
Recently, however, both budgets have been slashed due to Congressional “efforts” to 
decrease the US budget deficit. 
U.S. foreign aid may be decreasing in the short term. If assistance is cut it is not 
mathematically possible for all of the bases (interests) to be covered with fewer resources on 
hand. Some countries may lose resources or have them cut completely. China is not oblivious 
to America’s situation; it sees an opportunity to gain influence where gaps open. China can 
use arms sales to bolster its global stance and to open doors previously closed to them. 
For the last three to four decades the Chinese government has pursued economic 
advancement, and riding on these coattails has allowed the military to prosper. The People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has taken advantage of this policy. Today, the PLA is essentially a 
commercial conglomerate with close ties to international corporations like Huawei 
Technologies (Gertz, 2011; USCC Research, 2011). They have become not only a 
formidable military but also a savvy business operation. The PLA has invested in arms 
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manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, transportation, food production, and other lucrative business 
operations intended to expand their financial capabilities including the selling of arms 
(Bickford, 1994). Utilizing the PLA to sell arms in response to Taiwan arms purchases from 
the United States would not only bring positive political windfalls domestically but also 
increase the resources flow to Norinco and other Chinese arms manufacturers. 
These policy options would cause American decision-makers to train their eye away 
from Taiwan, but these actions would not follow in the traditional footsteps of PRC self-
assurance. The reciprocal responses outlined above would cause negative or even negligible 
results. China’s reaction to the American government selling arms to Taiwan must have the 
least amount of residual effects and the most positive outcomes. The only policy response 
that fits these characteristics is to sell arms to international pariah states. 
Hypothesis 
Arms sales by the U.S. government to the Taiwanese government will cause a 















In terms of the hypothesis, both the U.S. and Chinese governments support nations 
considered pariahs by the international system. From China’s viewpoint, Taiwan is an 
international pariah propped up by the United States. However, Taiwan falls closely in line 
with American interests regionally and values domestically. Additionally, the international 
community could consider the Israeli government as a pariah state for a number of reasons: 
nuclear ambitions, alleged terrorism/assassinations, and human rights violations in regards to 
the Palestinian people. The Israeli government however, is of regional, domestic, and moral 
importance for the U.S. For this essay, Taiwan and Israel are not considered pariahs because 
both nations hold interests and values that are closely aligned with American foreign policy. 
From the United States perspective, the North Korean government is a pariah and is 
supported by the PRC.
9
 The North Korean government is a repressive, brutal, and totalitarian 
regime that allows few human or political rights. U.S. interest lies with a non-nuclear Korean 
peninsula, and the North balks at this notion. Thus, North Korea is considered a pariah state 
because their policies are not aligned with American interests. Along with North Korea, the 
governments of Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Sudan, and Myanmar are considered 
international pariah states here.
10
 
                                                 
9 Utilizing the same US Department of State resources I could not find an exact number 
of countries that have official diplomatic relations with North Korea but the number is 
assumed to be relatively low. 
10 North Korea and Cuba were investigated at all levels of my research but no data was 
available and were subsequently not included in any statistical outputs. 
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Initially, I wanted my data to stretch as far back as 1982-1983. As you recall this was 
the time period following the August 17 Communiqué. However, the data I came across were 
strictly limited to a timeline from 1989-1991 until 2008. Thus, my most prominent data is in 
line with the fall of the Soviet Union until 2008. 
I utilized one of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 
databases to accumulate data on international arms sales. Through this particular database I 
was able to extract arms sales information by supplier nations and specified recipient nations. 
This search application allowed me to select China and the United States as supplier 
countries. As for the recipient countries I selected those pariah nations listed earlier with the 
addition of Taiwan. With these data I was able to calculate the total amount of arms sold by 
each supplier country per year to all recipient states indicated above. 
 I felt Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military expenditures would be the best 
control variables given the topic of this research. I used a SIPRI database for data on military 
expenditures by percentage of GDP for each recipient country. I then gathered the GDP, 
listed in billions of U.S. dollars, for each recipient country from an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) database. With these two pieces of information I calculated a weighted average. 
This weighted average data gave me an estimate of the amount of money, in U.S. dollars, that 
was available to be spent on arms purchases in any given year by pariah states. 
 I also gathered information for a placebo test. I decided comparing my hypothesis to 
another plausible situation would be beneficial. To conduct this test I gathered Russian arms 
sales totals to pariah states. I used the same list of pariah states and the same databases to 
switch the Russian government with the PRC as the responding government to U.S.-Taiwan 
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arms sales. For this placebo test and all other comparisons I used an ordinary least squares 
regression. 
 The first statistical framework produced was an attempt to test my null hypothesis. To 
investigate this I regressed total Chinese arms sales to international pariah states on total 
American arms sales to Taiwan between 1988 and 2008. The control variables were year of 
purchase and the weighted average variable discussed above. The statistical output is shown 
in Table 3. 
This regression model is statistically significance due to the F statistic (p=0.009). The 
adjusted R-square (0.374) is an acceptable outcome but is not magnificent.  However, the 
prediction variables (U.S. arms sales, Weighed Average, and Year) are not statistically 
significant. The statistical explanation for this outcome may be caused by multicollinearity. I 
feel the relationship between the data and the Year variable may be strong enough to produce 
this outcome. The perfect solution for multicollinearity is to obtain more data. If I was able to 
obtain data for Cuba and Iraq between 1988 and 2003 this problem may disappear. Obtaining 
more data may be perfect to solving this problem but it is also the most difficult to achieve. 
To predict this model more accurately in the future I may want to use variables that 
showcased the domestic environment of Taiwan and mainland China. 
 In an attempt to overcome this sluggish data I needed to reevaluate the data I was 
including. I felt the weighted average was an acceptable control variable given the research 
topic, which led me to the countries I included in the analysis labeled as rogue states. I felt 
there had to be other governments that I could include. The list of countries I could analyze 
was limited, but potentially also could include Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, and 
Venezuela. However, American foreign policy has always tended to act as if Sub-Saharan 
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Africa or any African country not touching the Mediterranean Sea was of little interest. Thus, 
including Eritrea and the like would not be useful to testing my null hypothesis. Furthermore, 
I felt adding Venezuela would be valuable since it is a pariah state in the eyes of the United 
States and does not act in alignment with American foreign policy goals in the Americas or 
internationally.  
The regression I conducted kept all things constant besides adding Venezuelan data 
into each variable (Table 4). Adding Venezuela had adverse effects when compared to my 
initial analysis. My F statistic increased dramatically from p=0.009 to p=0.043. The adjusted 
R-squared from this regression dropped from 0.374 to 0.249. 
Due to the lack of statistical or substantive significance of my data I felt it was 
necessary to rerun the regression again without Iraqi or Venezuelan data points. The Iraqi 
data I utilized in Table 3 and Table 4 were limited. The data collected were from the end of 
the Ba’athist regime to the current transition period (following American troop withdrawal). 
These data and the time period it represented were questionable in regards to Iraq’s status as 
a rogue state. Thus, I removed Iraqi data points from all variables. The statistical results from 
this regression can be found in Table 5. Removing the Iraqi data improved my coefficients 
and adjusted r-squared slightly but did not increase the data near statistically significance 
levels. Removing Iraq and Venezuela did benefit my analysis but the results were weak at 
best. With the results collected from these three statistical analyses I reject my null 
hypothesis. 
 I wanted to conduct another test, essentially a placebo test, intended to investigate the 
results of another plausible response to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales. I selected the Russian 
government for this test as the responding actor. I collected the same data and replaced the 
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PRC with the Russian Federation. The hypothesis for this test is an increase in U.S.-Taiwan 
arms sales with result in a reciprocal response from Russian in terms of total arms sales to 
international pariahs. I used the same pariah data and weighted average for this comparison 
as my initial null hypothesis. The results can be found in Table 6. The results from this 
analysis were expected. I did not think the Russian government would respond to U.S.-






















 The data I collected have a series of limitations. First and foremost the data set has a 
low number of observations (n=22), which limits the reliability of my results. Second, my 
scope is narrowly fixated on government-to-government arms sales totals. If I were to 
categorize or weight each specific type of arms sales the results may be profoundly altered. 
For example, if America sells Taiwan naval vessels there may be a correlation between 
China selling naval vessels to pariah states. I also used an American lens to view the world to 
define who are categorized as a pariah state. Additionally, there may be other indicators that 
influence arms sales between countries that I did not account for such as diplomatic history, 
bilateral or multilateral economic ties, and the amount or type of international political 
unrest. However, given my theory ignoring these variables was acceptable. This study is also 
limited due to its analysis of overt state-to-state arms sales to pariah states, which results in a 
relatively low number of observations. If these factors were calculated and accounted for the 
results may be definitively different. 
The U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship has a storied history dating back generations. I 
discussed at length this history including the three communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, 
and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. I also laid out alternative policy options the Chinese 
government could use as responses to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales. Additionally, I provided my 
theories regarding these options and why they are insufficient responses.  I felt U.S.-Taiwan 
arms sales resulted in the Chinese government selling arms to international pariah states. 
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Table 1. Policy decisions outlined within the Shanghai Communiqué. 
China's Stance America's Stance
The PRC is the sole legal government of China There is only one China
Taiwan is a province of China Taiwan is part of China
The Liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair Taiwan Question concluded peacefully 
No other country has the right to interfere in China's internal affairs A peaceful resolution done by the Chinese people




Table 2. The top twenty weapons manufacturers separated by country. 




















Table 3. Total Chinese arms sales to international pariah states compared to total American 
arms sales to Taiwan. 
Source SS       df MS n = 22
Model 42.046 3 14.015 Prob > F 0.009
Residual 48.624 18 2.701 R-squared 0.464
Adj R-squared 0.374
Total 90.67 21 4.318 Root MSE 1.644
Total China Sales Coef. Std. Err.     t (95% Conf. Interval)
Total USA Sales 0.059 0.176 0.34 -0.309 0.428
Standard Weight -0.292 1.494 -0.2 -3.431 2.846
Year -0.245 0.14 -1.75 -0.539 0.05




Table 4. Adding Venezuela data to the regression as a new pariah state. 
Source SS       df MS n = 22
Model 24.69 3 8.23 Prob > F 0.043
Residual 44.607 18 2.478 R-squared 0.356
Adj R-squared 0.249
Total 69.296 21 3.3 Root MSE 1.574
China Sales Plus Venezuela Coef. Std. Err. t (95% Conf. Interval)
Total USA Sales -0.063 0.169 -0.37 -0.419 0.293
Weight including Venezuela 0.238 1.374 0.17 -2.648 3.124
Year -0.146 0.113 -1.29 -0.382 0.091







Table 5.  Table 3 regression with Iraqi data removed. 
 
Source SS       df MS n = 22
Model 42.616 3 14.205 Prob > F 0.009
Residual 48.419 18 2.69 R-squared 0.468
Adj R-squared 0.38
Total 91.035 21 4.335 Root MSE 1.64
China No Iraq Coef. Std. Err.     t (95% Conf. Interval)
Total USA Sales 0.06 0.175 0.34 -0.308 0.428
Weight Excluding Iraq -0.325 1.257 -0.26 -2.966 2.316
Year -0.253 0.137 -1.85 -0.54 0.034




Table 6. Placebo test, where Russian arms sales replace Chinese arms sales for comparison to 
U.S.-Taiwan arms sales. 
Source SS       df MS n = 22
Model 62.057 3 20.686 Prob > F 0.014
Residual 80.338 18 4.463 R-squared 0.436
Adj R-squared 0.342
Total 142.395 21 6.781 Root MSE 2.113
Total Russian Sales Coef. Std. Err.     t (95% Conf. Interval)
Total USA Sales -0.109 0.226 -0.48 -0.583 0.365
Standard Weight 2.736 1.92 1.43 -1.298 6.77
Year 0.483 0.18 2.68 0.104 0.861








Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. Total arms sales by country separated by year. 
Year USA Sales Total China Sales Total Russia Sales total China Sales Plus Venezuela Russia sales Plus Venezuela
1979 0 0 308 0 308
1980 120 0 0 0 0
1983 170 0 0 0 0
1986 27 0 0 0 0
1987 12 0 0 0 0
1988 0 136 0 136 0
1989 264 423 0 423 0
1990 314 324 0 324 0
1991 184 165 151 165 151
1992 159 397 0 397 0
1993 22 397 18 397 18
1994 796 58 4 58 4
1995 638 11 7 11 29
1996 196 6 5 6 6
1997 797 12 0 12 0
1998 3487 296 3005 296 3005
1999 1005 0 18 0 18
2000 242 9 228 9 228
2001 25 48 120 48 120
2002 231 17 12 17 12
2003 831 10 46 10 46
2004 186 12 562 12 562
2005 66 50 1101 2008 1106
2006 0 0 754 2013 2673
2007 650 0 290 2007 290
2008 454 0 2 2029 4790
2009 1214 50 191 2009 3161
2010 1104 0 521 2110 2134






Figure 2. Recipient country weighted average of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military 
expenditures by percentage of GDP. 
Year Standard Weighted Average Standard  Weighted  No Iraq All Pariah Weighted  Plus Venezuela All Pariah Weighted No Iraq
1979 - - - -
1980 - - - -
1983 - - - -
1986 - - - -
1987 - - - -
1988 3.56 3.56 2.91 2.91
1989 3.53 3.53 3.08 3.08
1990 3.70 3.70 3.19 3.19
1991 3.52 3.52 3.28 3.28
1992 3.30 3.30 3.07 3.07
1993 3.62 3.62 3.40 3.40
1994 3.78 3.78 3.49 3.49
1995 3.18 3.18 2.92 2.92
1996 2.85 2.85 2.61 2.61
1997 3.25 3.25 3.03 3.03
1998 3.29 3.29 3.00 3.00
1999 2.98 2.98 2.71 2.71
2000 2.88 2.88 2.62 2.62
2001 2.97 2.97 2.69 2.69
2002 2.38 2.38 2.19 2.19
2003 2.72 2.72 2.31 2.31
2004 2.54 2.46 2.35 2.37
2005 2.54 2.42 2.34 2.33
2006 2.45 2.29 2.29 2.27
2007 2.09 1.91 1.94 1.89
2008 2.13 1.70 1.97 1.74
2009 1.46 1.12 1.42 1.22
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00










Figure 3. Arms sales separated by year and supplier nation showcasing Iraq data. 
Year China Pariah Sales Total minus Iraq Russia Pariah Sales Total Minus Iraq China all Recipients minus Iraq Russian all Recipients minus Iraq
1979 0 308 0 308
1980 0 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0 0
1986 0 0 0 0
1987 0 0 0 0
1988 136 0 136 0
1989 423 0 423 0
1990 324 0 324 0
1991 165 151 165 151
1992 397 0 397 0
1993 397 18 397 18
1994 58 4 58 4
1995 11 29 11 29
1996 6 6 6 6
1997 12 0 12 0
1998 296 3005 296 3005
1999 0 18 0 18
2000 9 228 9 228
2001 48 120 48 120
2002 12 12 12 12
2003 10 46 10 46
2004 12 562 12 562
2005 50 1096 53 1101
2006 0 749 7 662
2007 0 285 0 285
2008 0 2 21 2782
2009 50 191 50 1202
2010 0 521 100 124
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